Lockdown and border closures
(BBC News Was the scientific evidence for lockdown flawed? 19 Nov. 2020.)
23 Jan. 2020: A woman unknowingly infected with Covid-19 flew to the UK from Wuhan and passed through the airport undetected. Eight days later she and a family member became the first confirmed UK cases, followed by many others who spread the virus in February and March when returning from China and from holidays in Italy, France and Spain. It is now thought that there were 1,500 UK cases during that period, so the UK was hit hard. Closing borders earlier could have reduced UK infections.
Modellers used information about the early cases held in the First Few Hundred (FF100) database to assess how the virus might spread, but FF100 was missing basic epidemiological information. Data was needed not only on where the virus was coming from, but also on who was worst affected.
Mid-February. Evidence from China showed older people were especially at risk, so modellers advised that 'cocooning' would reduce deaths. Unfortunately models did not reflect how care homes actually work, or the serious risk from agency staff working in multiple homes.
Early March. Due to lack of accurate date, plans were still based on a fairly slow growing pandemic with a peak of cases in 12 to 14 weeks. One scientist thought official figures (913 cases) were wrong and called for an immediate lockdown; experts now estimate there were 75,000. Investigation focused on cases in intensive care units, as there be very many more who had a mild symptoms. The prediction was for c.100,000 new cases each day by mid-March, followed about a week later by 20,000 people each day needing hospital treatment. It was also realized that the NHS data was out of date, in many cases up to a week old.
17 March. First restriction imposed - stopping non-essential contact with others, unnecessary travel, working from home and avoiding pubs, clubs, theatres and other social venues. It was thought that without this cases could double every five or six days. Data from Italy indicated that the virus was spreading at nearly twice the speed that had been thought - with the NHS potentially just days away from being swamped.
So should we have acted earlier? Modelling now suggests that if lockdown had been imposed a week earlier, we may have avoided around half the number of deaths. Relying only on modelling and using that alone to drive the response it turns out was not the right thing to do.
Test and Trace
(BBC News Coronavirus: inside test-and-trace - how the 'world-beater' went wrong. 20 Nov. 2020)
Just half of close contacts reported to England's Test and Trace are being reached in some areas. As attempts continue to get it back on track, it is still struggling with the legacy of decisions made at the outset.
NHS Test and Trace is not one whole service nor is it part of the NHS. It is a complex web of several programmes that have been bolted together quickly. Private firms play a key role, so some of the local expertise available in the NHS, universities and councils has been bypassed.
Private contractors overpromised what they could do (e.g. saying they could build 200 testing machines when they did not even have a prototype).
17 March. No-one from NHS labs was at a key government meeting with private firms (e.g. health-technology firms Randox and ThermoFisher) where it was decided to set up large, centralised labs outside any existing healthcare or research structures. This network of six mega-labs (Lighthouse labs) process the bulk of the tests across the UK. Testing sites were set up by financial and tech services company Deloitte. The contact centre is run by Sitel, and the 18,000 contact tracers are mostly employed by outsourcing company Serco - but does include c. 3,000 clinicians, some from the NHS. (This applies to England only, the rest of the UK has their own arrangements.) Contracts were awarded very quickly and many had no penalty clauses for poor performance.
Nov. 2020. England now has a large testing capacity, which can process more than 500,000 virus tests a day (up from 2,000 per day). But the system still struggles to get results quickly, since many samples were sent long distances for processing. If the approach had remained local by using existing networks of hospital, university and Public Health England, turn around would be much quicker.
Other companies were selling testing machines to NHS labs which did testing for hospitals - but the kits and chemicals needed for those machines were in short supply and being bought by the privately-owned Lighthouse labs.
The later move to more local contact tracing by councils was undermined by IT problems, leading to a reliance on spreadsheets and delays getting contact details.
Testing Targets
The government focused on hitting very high testing targets, but less so on who should get tests and why. People working in hospitals were not screened unless they had symptoms, despite evidence showing significant transmission there. However despite being 'effectively discouraged' to do so, some labs set up regular screening for healthcare staff. (E.g. The Univ. of Cambridge research lab partnered with nearby Addenbrooke's to offer this, and by the end of June had screened more than 10,000 hospital staff to detect asymptomatic carriers.)
Sept. 2020. Just as the second wave was starting, tests became near-impossible to access, due to people returning from holidays and children going back to school. The Lighthouse labs struggled as they were unable to forecast the sample numbers which varied wildly from day to day - so having enough staff to process 10,000 samples and only receiving 2,000 or having more than expected. As those involved in setting up the labs didn't always have experience with viruses, procedures needed constant tweaking, and there were issues with recruitment and training.
Tracing
Of the c. 18,000 contact tracers hired, only about 3,000 had a clinical background. While those who get the best results are good communicators, tracers were told to follow heavily scripted cues. With no room for discretion, call handlers had to try to make individual calls to every member of a household and go through the same forms. Unfortunately contact tracers often get abuse because of this. The government now says the system will be changed.
Performance is not at the right level. Advisors say 80% of those who test positive should be reached and close contact details obtained, and 80% of those contacts should be reached and asked to isolate. In some areas only half of contacts are reached. A change to greater local involvement was announced in August but funding was only announced in late October.
And local schemes still face problems due to the centralised system. Delays getting cases passed down from the national team. Cases passed on are missing key contact information or are duplicates of cases already traced. Lack of access to NHS Test and Trace central IT system means councils are forced to record the information they collect on spreadsheets. Councils are only allowed to trace the infected case, so cannot deal with family members, even if they are on the door-step.
While money was allocated to find individuals, there was little thought on how to support people asked to isolate. The number isolating after a positive test or as a close contact is not routinely measured. Some have argued that the isolation period is too long - some other countries only require 7 days. Financial support for those isolating is limited to statutory sick pay; a one-off £500 payment for those on benefits is not available if you've been told to isolate via the app. The consequence is that people are less cooperative.
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